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Celebration was in the air. British Petroleum (BP) executives 
gathered in the gallery of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig to celebrate 
their safety record and the completion of drilling work on the rig.1 As 
one could imagine, the sounds of champagne corks popping, laughter, 
and friendly banter filled the gallery. The sounds of celebration and 
hubris, however, were soon silenced as the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
began to shake and disaster struck the Gulf Coast. 
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred forty 
miles off the Louisiana coast.2 The spill left eleven dead and caused 
unprecedented economic and ecological damage across the Gulf 
Coast.3 The damage, however, was not entirely caused by the 
negligence of rig employees or the failure of rig safety equipment. 
The blame for the Deepwater Horizon spill ultimately rests on the 
federal government’s failure to maintain proper regulatory oversight 
over deepwater oil exploration. 
The Deepwater Horizon spill exposed a variety of regulatory 
failures by the federal government. After the spill, critics attacked 
regulators for an inadequate environmental review process under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Policymakers also 
attacked the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) numerous 
conflicts of interest with the oil industry.4 This Comment, however, 
focuses on the federal government’s failure to implement a regulatory 
regime mandating adequate safety and cleanup technology in 
deepwater oil exploration. Ultimately, this Comment seeks to remedy 
 
1 Cain Burdeau et al., Bubble of Methane Triggered Gulf Oil Rig Blast, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/08 
/bubble-of-methane-trigger_n_568842.html (noting that BP executives were celebrating 
the company’s safety record on the Deepwater Horizon the day of the rig’s blowout). 
2 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING 1 (2011) [hereinafter, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER]. 
3 Id. 
4 The Minerals Management Service was the regulatory agency within the U.S. 
Department of the Interior that oversaw offshore oil exploration and production at the time 
of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 
REGULATORY BLOWOUT: HOW REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER 
POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED TO AVOID A RECURRENCE 21–27 
(2010) [hereinafter, REGULATORY BLOWOUT]. 
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this failure by proposing a regulatory regime that implements a Best 
Available Technology (BAT) standard for deepwater oil exploration 
safety and cleanup technology.5 
Part I examines the deficiencies in safety technology that led to the 
Deepwater Horizon spill and the inadequate spill response that 
exacerbated the spill’s harm to the Gulf Coast.6 It also presents the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the principal statute 
governing offshore oil exploration, and its regulatory failures.7 Part I 
also discusses the BAT standard found in the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), and the BAT standard that ultimately serves as a guide for 
regulatory safety and cleanup technology schemes for deepwater oil 
exploration.8 Part I concludes by presenting the European Union’s 
(EU) call for increased regulatory oversight in offshore oil 
exploration.9 
Part II applies the CWA’s BAT standard to establish safety and 
cleanup technology standards for deepwater oil exploration through 
OCSLA.10 Part II also addresses the need for a statutory prohibition 
on economic variances for the proposed BAT standard under 
OCSLA.11 Finally, Part II suggests that the United States and the 
international community implement information disclosure 
mechanisms to ensure safe deepwater exploration worldwide.12 In 
conclusion, this Comment urges Congress to amend OCSLA and 
charge the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement (BOEMRE) with the task of promulgating a BAT 
 
5 This Comment advocates for the adoption of the CWA’s BAT Standard. The CWA’s 
BAT Standard requires the implementation of the “best available technology economically 
achievable. . . .” See Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A)(i) (2011). 
6 See discussion infra Part I. A–B (discussing the mistakes that led to the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill). 
7 See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and its 
accompanying regulatory regime). 
8 See discussion infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the “Best Available Technology 
Economically Achievable” standard under the CWA). 
9 See discussion infra Part I.E (discussing the European Union’s recent 
recommendations for greater regulatory oversight in offshore oil exploration). 
10 See discussion infra Part II.A–D (applying the CWA’s BAT standard and its 
promulgation procedure to deepwater oil exploration safety and cleanup technology). 
11 See discussion infra Part II.E (discussing the need for a statutory prohibition on 
economic variances under any promulgated BAT standard for deepwater oil exploration 
safety and cleanup technology). 
12 See discussion infra Part II.F. 
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standard for safety and cleanup technology for deepwater oil 
exploration.13 
I 
THE REGULATORY COLLAPSE 
A.  “The Well From Hell”14 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred because of the lack of 
oversight by regulators and the oil industry at challenging deepwater 
oil exploration sites. Before the blowout, the Deepwater Horizon rig 
floated 4,992 feet above the Gulf Coast seafloor.15 Initial plans called 
for the Deepwater Horizon rig to drill over 20,000 feet to reach oil 
deposits in the Macondo oil prospect reservoir.16 In addition, at the 
time of the blowout, BP was six weeks behind schedule and fifty-
eight million dollars over budget.17 The Macondo well presented 
unexpected challenges that, when combined with the rig’s time and 
financial difficulties, led to safety shortcuts that ultimately caused the 
Deepwater Horizon rig’s deadly blowout. 
The spill began when pressurized methane gas caused a gas kick 
within the Deepwater Horizon rig’s wellbore.18 The gas kick caused a 
marine riser to ascend and collide with the rig’s base.19 Rig 
employees likened the marine riser’s collision with the platform to “a 
550-ton freight train hitting the rig floor.”20 The explosion caused by 
the riser’s collision resulted in a blowout on the well.21 The blowout, 
however, worsened when the platform’s blowout preventer (BOP), 
the device that seals a well in cases of emergency, malfunctioned.22 
The blowout preventer’s failure to seal the well resulted in the 
catastrophic loss of valuable crude oil, ecological habitats, and human 
 
13 See discussion infra Part III. 
14 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 2 (noting the nickname 
given to the Macondo exploration well by Deepwater Horizon rig employees). 
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 89. 
17 Id. at 2. 
18 Id. at 89–114 (explaining how immense pressure caused a gas kick that led to the 
well’s eventual blowout). 
19 Id. 
20 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 114 (citing Testimony of 
Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 
2010, 244). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 114–15. 
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life throughout the Gulf Coast.23 The resulting explosion killed eleven 
rig employees and critically injured four others.24 Over eighty-seven 
days, the damaged well leaked over 4.9 million barrels of crude oil 
into the Gulf Coast.25 The massive amount of oil deposited into the 
Gulf decimated the shrimp and oyster habitats that Gulf fishermen 
depended on for their livelihood.26 The spill also disturbed the fragile 
ecological balance of the Gulf Coast wetlands.27 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster, however, was not a mere 
accident, but the culmination of multiple human and regulatory 
errors.28 The primary error was BP’s failure to construct sufficient 
barriers to control sudden gas flows or “kicks” that often occur in 
deepwater oil drilling.29 Kicks occur when pressurized gas enters a 
wellbore and attempts to rapidly ascend to the surface.30 Gas kicks 
that flow uncontrollably to the surface because the barriers within a 
wellbore fail can result in a blowout.31 The typical industry practice to 
control kicks is the construction of multiple barriers throughout an 
exploration well.32 
 
23 See Bruce Barcott, Forlorn in the Bayou, NAT’L GEO., Oct. 2010, at 61 available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/10/gulf-oil-spill/barcott-text (discussing the 
plight of Louisiana’s oyster beds and wetland in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill). “One-third of the United States oyster and shrimp crop comes out of the waters 
along the Louisiana Coast.” Roughly ninety-eight percent of the fish, shrimp, crab, and 
oyster habitats depend on the four million acres of wetlands in the Barataria-Terrebone 
estuary southwest of New Orleans. Id.  
24 Leslie Kaufman, Search Ends for Missing Oil Rig Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/24spill.html?_r=1&hpw. 
25 Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oilspill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels Into 
Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST. Aug. 3, 2010 available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695 
.html. 
26 See Barcott, supra note 23. 
27 Id. 
28 See David Hammer, 5 Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Fatal 
Gulf Oil Rig Blowout, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Sept. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal 
_me.html. 
29 Id. See also Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Energy and Natural Res., 111th Cong. 7-8 (2010) (testimony of Prof. F.E. Beck, Professor 
of Petroleum Engineering, Texas A&M University) [hereinafter Massive Oil Spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico]. 
30 See Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 29, at 7. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Initially, the Deepwater Horizon rig’s crew planned to drill to 
depths over 20,000 feet.33 The typical industry practice for such a well 
normally consists of a large tube lined with a shorter tie-back tube 
roughly 1,500 feet from the bottom of the well.34 The tie-back tube 
serves as a secondary barrier to gas kicks that can cause blowouts 
similar to the one that caused the Deepwater Horizon rig’s blowout.35 
BP, however, constructed a single tube running the full span of the 
wellbore.36 While computer simulations and engineering experts 
raised concerns that the well’s design allowed a significant amount of 
gas to escape to the top of the well, BP responded that “not running 
the tie-back saves a good deal of time/money.”37 
BP’s utilization of the single tube design was not the sole error that 
led to the well’s eventual blowout. The single tube model, while not 
the typical industry practice, could operate safely provided that a 
cement seal was applied to prevent gas from escaping and rising to 
the surface.38 However, the cement seal solution is only effective if 
the wellbore is perfectly centered.39 If not centered, the cement will be 
unevenly distributed throughout the well and leave parts of the well 
vulnerable to gas kicks.40 To maintain the centralization of the well, 
devices known as centralizers are used throughout the wellbore.41 
Engineers advised BP that twenty-one centralizers were needed to 
ensure an adequate cement seal.42 BP, however, installed only six 
centralizers in the wellbore.43 Although further testing showed that 
the use of only six centralizers created a “severe risk of gas flow,” BP 
ignored the warning and did not install additional centralizers.44 
 
33 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 89. 
34 Hammer, supra note 28. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 95–97. 
40 Id. at 96. 
41 Id. 
42 Dan Farber, BP CEO Hayward’s Flimsy Ignorance Defense, CBS NEWS (June 18, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008141-503544.html. 
43 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 96 (After completion of the 
cement job, engineers conducted a successful test of the cement seal. Based on this single 
test, BP decided to forgo any additional tests of the seal’s durability.). 
44 Hammer, supra note 28. 
BUSH 1/10/2012  9:16 AM 
2011] Addressing the Regulatory Collapse Behind the 541 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
Finally, BP concluded that a full evaluation of the cement seal was 
not needed based on the success of the cement job.45 
In addition to the cement seal and tie-back methods, drilling fluid, 
often called drilling mud, is also used as a barrier to gas kicks.46 
Initially, the Deepwater Horizon rig utilized drilling mud to control 
any kicks that may occur.47 Then, after misinterpreting test results 
regarding pressure building up inside the wellbore, BP abandoned 
drilling mud and used seawater as a barrier within the wellbore 
instead.48 Seawater, however, provides less protection from gas kicks 
primarily because seawater is forty percent lighter than drilling mud.49 
BP’s well site leader, Robert Kaluza, was confused by BP 
management’s decision to use seawater and stated that “[m]aybe they 
were trying to save time. At the end of [a] well sometimes they think 
about speeding up.”50 Ultimately, the misinterpreted pressure test 
results along with the replacement of drilling mud with seawater 
prevented the Deepwater Horizon crew from noticing signs of gas 
kicks fifty minutes prior to the blowout.51 
The most costly error, however, was BP’s failure to maintain and 
inspect the well’s blowout preventer.52 The blowout preventer is the 
last line of defense for a well experiencing a possible blowout.53 
Blowout preventers allow platform employees to keep a gas kick from 
transforming into a blowout.54 When the blowout preventer is 
activated, shears located near the wellbore cut and seal the wellbore.55 
However, the Deepwater Horizon rig’s blowout preventer shears 
 
45 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 102–03. 
46 Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 29, at 9. 
47 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 103–04 (noting that 
Deepwater Horizon engineers first used drilling mud to control kicks before displacing 
drilling mud with seawater). 
48 See Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 29, at 35 (noting that prior 
testing indicated that displacing drilling mud with seawater raised concerns about the 
wellbore’s stability). 
49 Hammer, supra note 28. 
50 Id. 
51 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 105–14. 
52 Id. at 114–15. 
53 See Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 29, at 23 (noting the 
importance of blowout preventer as a last resort mechanism for offshore rigs experiencing 
a potential blowout). 
54 Id. at 89. 
55 Id. 
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failed to cut or seal the well, allowing the gas kick to result in a 
blowout.56 
The eventual failure of the blowout preventer was not a complete 
surprise. Prior to its failure, Deepwater Horizon employees reported 
that they were aware the blowout preventer contained leaks. In 
addition, error messages from the preventer were sent up to the 
blowout preventer’s control station.57 BP officials, however, ignored 
these warnings against the advice of rig officials and federal 
regulations.58 Federal regulations mandate that platforms must 
suspend further drilling operations if a blowout preventer control 
station does not function properly.59 BP, however, ignored this 
regulation despite multiple warnings regarding the viability of the 
blowout preventer. In addition, the Deepwater Horizon rig’s blowout 
preventer had not been inspected and certified as stable by an 
independent third party since 2005.60 
Ultimately, the shortcuts taken by BP management and engineers 
proved deadly for rig employees and the Gulf Coast. However, one 
shortcut alone did not cause the Deepwater Horizon spill. Rather, 
BP’s failure to construct a tie-back tube or install extra centralizers, 
the replacement of drilling mud with seawater, and the failure to 
maintain the blowout preventer all combined to cause the worst 
disaster in the history of offshore oil exploration. 
B.  Unprepared for Response 
The Deepwater Horizon spill shows that not only is the oil industry 
incapable of preventing major spills, but it is also incapable of 
responding to spills once they have occurred.61 In the days following 
the spill, BP and MMS regulators remained positive about their 
ability to contain and stop the flow of oil into the Gulf.62 Early 
 
56 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 114. 
57 Id. See also Hammer, supra note 28. 
58 Hammer, supra note 28. 
59 See 30 C.F.R. § 250.516 (2010). 
60 Dina Cappiello, Deepwater Horizon: Federal Engineers Mistakenly Thought Failed 
Equipment Received Independent Inspection, Is Now Mandating It, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 30, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/30/deepwater-horizon 
-federal_n_699506.html. 
61 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 129–71 (explaining the 
difficulties faced by industry and regulators in responding to the Deepwater Horizon spill). 
62 Id. at 132 (noting BP’s belief that oil spill response contractors could adequately 
contain the oil spill’s potential effects). 
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estimates predicted that only 1,000 barrels of oil would leak each day 
from the well,63 but it was later determined that oil was leaking at a 
rate of 60,000 barrels per day.64 BP further claimed that its contracts 
with oil removal companies could reclaim up to 500,000 barrels per 
day.65 Unfortunately, oil spill response technology had not improved 
in the twenty years since the Exxon Valdez disaster, and spill 
response vessels were quickly overwhelmed.66 
While spill response teams were outmatched at the Gulf’s surface, 
they were completely unprepared for the challenges that lay 
thousands of feet below the rig. Although the federal government 
recognized the need for subsea oil containment technology after the 
Santa Barbara Channel spill in 1969, oil containment technology for 
deepwater wells, like the Macondo well, did not exist.67 After 
realizing that the Deepwater Horizon rig’s blowout preventer could 
not be revived, BP and regulators were forced to generate deepwater 
containment technology in order to cap the well.68 
The lack of any existing deepwater containment technology 
prevented BP and regulators from capping the leaking well for eighty-
seven days.69 Initially, BP attempted to use a containment dome that 
would funnel leaking oil to containment ships at the surface.70 
However, partly due to the incorrect estimates regarding the amount 
of oil leaking from the damaged well, the containment dome proved 
unsuccessful.71 After the failure of the containment dome, BP utilized 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 146. 
65 Id. at 132. 
66 Id. 
67 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 135. The Santa Barbara 
Channel oil spill occurred off the California coast in 1969 after a blowout on an offshore 
oil rig. The spill leaked over three million barrels of oil over a thirty-five-mile area 
between Isla Vista and Ventura, California. See Colby Frazier, Locals Remember Oil Spill 
Like It was Yesterday, DAILY SOUND, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.thedaily 
sound.com/012809Oil. 
68 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 135. 
69 Id. at 165. 
70 Id. at 145–46. 
71 The containment dome ultimately failed due to the large amount of hydrates present 
near the leak. It is believed that the incorrect estimates regarding the amount of oil leaking 
from the well prevented response teams from designing the containment dome to 
withstand the massive hydrate amounts causing the containment dome to rise towards the 
surface. Id. at 46. 
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the “top kill” and “junk shot” methods to seal the well.72 These 
methods called for the pumping of excess drilling mud into the 
wellbore to force oil back into the oil reservoir and then the pumping 
of rubber materials to clog the well to prevent oil from leaking into 
the ocean.73 Like the containment dome, the top kill ultimately failed; 
after three attempts, the method was discontinued.74 BP then 
attempted to control the well’s leakage via a “static kill.”75 The static 
kill method is similar to the top kill method because it utilizes drilling 
mud to force oil back into the oil reservoir.76 The static kill, however, 
requires lower pumping rates of drilling mud than the top kill because 
oil and gas in the well are static.77 After completing the first relief 
well, BP executed the static kill, and on August 4, 2010, regulators 
announced the static kill’s success.78 
BP also utilized dispersants to prevent oil from spreading to the 
Gulf’s beaches and wetlands.79 Dispersants help contain the spread of 
oil reaching the surface by breaking down oil’s composition, allowing 
it to dissolve into the water column.80 Although dispersants were 
alleviating the harms of the spill at the ocean’s surface, deepwater 
dispersants were needed to break down oil at the wellbore’s leak 
site.81 Response teams, however, could not utilize deepwater 
dispersants to break down oil prior to its ascent to the surface.82 
Deepwater dispersant technology, like deepwater containment 
technology, was untested by federal agencies and industry.83 Thus, 
response teams anxiously waited while the EPA established directives 
 
72 Id. at 148–50. 
73 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 149. 
74 Id. at 150. 
75 Id. at 166–67. 
76 Id. at 166. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 167. 
79 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 143–45 (explaining the 
initial use of oil dispersants after the Deepwater Horizon spill). 
80 Id. at 143. 
81 Concerns existed over the toxicity of dispersant use at the Gulf’s surface. Although 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) stated dispersants were safe, 
spill response workers reported headaches and nausea after coming into contact with 
dispersants. Response teams believed that using deepwater dispersants would alleviate 
potential health risks to workers in addition to breaking down oil at the oil leak source. Id. 
at 144. 
82 Id. at 144. 
83 Id. at 144–45, 135. 
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and guidelines on deepwater dispersant use.84 Almost three weeks 
after the spill, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson approved deepwater 
dispersant use in what she would later describe as “the hardest 
decision she ever made.”85 Deepwater dispersants were successful and 
never exceeded the EPA’s toxicity guidelines, and their use continued 
until BP successfully capped the well weeks later.86 It is still 
unknown, however, if earlier use of the dispersants would have 
alleviated the oil leak’s effects on the Gulf. 
While BP and regulators did not implement the proper prevention 
mechanisms prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill, their response 
mechanisms were also inadequate. Thus, the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster provides the public with a glimpse of the devastation that can 
occur when federal regulators and industry do not prepare for disaster. 
Most importantly, the Deepwater Horizon disaster calls for a reform 
of the entire regulatory and industry mindset with respect to 
deepwater oil exploration safety and cleanup technology standards. 
C.  Regulatory Failure Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is the primary statute 
regulating oil and gas exploration in the Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS). The purpose of OCSLA states that 
operations in the Outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a 
safe manner by well-trained personnel using technology, 
precautions, and techniques sufficient to prevent or minimize the 
likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, spillages, physical 
obstruction to other users of the water or subsoil and seabed, or 
other occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or 
to property, or endanger life or health.87 
OCSLA safety compliance is now administered by the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement after the 
breakup of the MMS.88 Under OCSLA, oil and gas explorations are 
regulated in four ways: (1) the development of leasing plans,89 (2) the 
 
84 Id. at 145. 
85 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 145. 
86 Id. 
87 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2010). 
88 REGULATORY BLOWOUT, supra note 4, at 12. 
89 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, § 1334. 
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issuance of oil or gas leases,90 (3) the approval of a lessee’s 
exploration plan,91 and (4) the approval of a lessee’s development and 
production plan.92 
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, critics cited 
several concerns over the statutory provisions within OCSLA as well 
as its administration by the MMS. First, critics noted that OCSLA 
lacks clear mandates for safety and cleanup technology standards in 
deepwater exploration.93 Second, safety regulations under OCSLA did 
not respond to increased and more hazardous deepwater oil 
exploration activity in the Gulf Coast.94 Finally, many argued that the 
MMS failed to adequately enforce regulations because of insufficient 
resources and conflicts of interest with the oil industry.95 
Under OCSLA, Congress charged the MMS with ensuring that 
offshore oil exploration was conducted in a safe manner “by well-
trained personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques 
sufficient to prevent or minimize” the risk of accidents in offshore oil 
exploration.96 Because of the extensive language regarding safety 
under OCSLA, the MMS was given broad discretion to promulgate 
regulations for deepwater oil exploration safety and cleanup 
technology. While the MMS did promulgate detailed regulations for 
safety technology on offshore platforms, their regulations lagged 
behind the rapid advances made in offshore drilling safety 
technology.97 Furthermore, the MMS largely relied on the oil industry 
to provide information regarding standard industry technology 
practices and characterized their relationship with the oil industry as 
“a partner [rather] than a policeman.”98 Deepwater oil exploration, 
however, required more technology to accommodate greater drilling 
pressures and increasing distances from shore-based safety and 
environmental resources. Unfortunately, MMS regulations did not 
 
90 See id. §§ 1337, 1345. 
91 See id. § 1340. 
92 See id. § 1351. 
93 REGULATORY BLOWOUT, supra note 4, at 13. 
94 See generally DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 68–85. 
95 See id. (discussing how the MMS’s failed to adequately enforce its regulations 
because of insufficient enforcement resources). 
96 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, § 1332(6). 
97 See DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 68–85 (discussing the 
MMS’s failure to adopt sufficient regulatory reforms to counter increased and more 
difficult oil exploration in the Gulf Coast). 
98 Id. at 71–72. 
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mandate that the oil industry adopt these advances in technology.99 
Without any type of standard mandating advanced technology, the oil 
industry possessed no incentive to pursue safer drilling technology.100 
Congress and the MMS also failed to promulgate stringent 
standards for oil spill cleanup technology. OCSLA and MMS 
regulations both lack a clear and enforceable cleanup technology 
standard.101 While the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) requires lessees to 
have spill response plans that clean oil spills “to the maximum extent 
practicable,”102 MMS regulations weakened this requirement by 
defining “maximum extent practicable” as “within the limitations of 
available technology.”103 Furthermore, the MMS only required that 
lessees prepare response plans for oil spills that continue for up to 
thirty days.104 In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, 
regulators noted that spill response plans did not require the oil 
industry to address deepwater containment at an oil leak’s source.105 
The lack of a clear and enforceable cleanup technology standard—
along with other inadequate regulations—shows the federal 
government’s laissez-faire attitude towards spill cleanup, which 
ultimately led to the inadequacies in BP’s spill response plan and 
cleanup efforts. 
Besides lacking strong regulatory standards for safety and cleanup 
technology, the MMS also lacked adequate enforcement resources.106 
Although blowout preventers are the last line of defense for offshore 
oil disasters, the MMS cut inspection requirements because of 
inadequate staffing and mounting pressure from the oil industry.107 As 
oil industry activity increased in the Gulf Coast, MMS regulators 
 
99 Id. at 73. 
100 See generally REGULATORY BLOWOUT, supra note 4, at 13. 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2010). 
103 30 C.F.R. § 254.6 (2010). 
104 Id. at § 254.47. The requirement that spill response plans only address spills lasting 
up to thirty days represents a failure by the federal government to mandate responses plans 
that address worst case scenarios similar to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. 
105 OUTER CONT’L SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD., U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, 
REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 28 (2010). 
106 See DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 72–82 (discussing the 
MMS’s lack of adequate enforcement resources). 
107 Id. at 73-74 (noting that the MMS cut the number of required blowout preventer 
inspections by fifty percent despite reports that technical studies showed that the 
possibility of high blowout preventer failure rates under deepwater conditions). 
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responsible for permit approval and compliance were overwhelmed 
with an increased influx of permit requests.108 Faced with an 
amplified workload, MMS regulators often failed to give the 
necessary scrutiny to permit applications.109 Not surprisingly, the oil 
industry would “permit shop” until an approving MMS regulator was 
found.110 In the end, the MMS lacked sufficient resources to properly 
enforce its weakened and inadequate regulatory scheme, even as oil 
exploration in the Gulf Coast increased and became more 
hazardous.111 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster shows how a weak regulatory 
scheme without sufficient enforcement resources, when combined 
with an increase in oil exploration and industry influence, can result 
in disaster. The lack of a clear and enforceable safety technology 
standard hinders OCSLA’s ability to prevent offshore oil platform 
accidents. Inadequate cleanup technology standards and lax worst-
case response plans leave the oil industry unprepared to respond to 
spills. In addition, insufficient enforcement resources prevent 
regulators from keeping pace with increased deepwater exploration 
and industry influence. Thus, Congress must reform OCSLA and its 
accompanying regulatory scheme as well as provide strong regulatory 
standards and the resources needed to enforce those standards. 
D.  Finding a Regulatory Solution 
The primary goal of a regulatory scheme for deepwater oil 
exploration safety and cleanup technology is the prevention of future 
oil spills, while still providing adequate response mechanisms for 
when spills do occur. While the goal of such a venture is clear, it is 
necessary to find a regulatory scheme that best reaches this goal. 
 
108 “The oil and gas industry works 24/7, but MMS regulators generally work regular 
office hours, requiring ‘on-call’ responsibility to be assigned to individual senior 
engineers. Those engineers, however, work at a marked disadvantage because they cannot 
gain access to the permit database from off-site locations due to security concerns.” Id. at 
74–75. 
109 Id. at 74–75. 
110 Id. at 74 (discussing how a seventy-one percent rise in the number of offshore oil 
permits in the Gulf Coast between 2005 and 2009 forced the oil industry to seek permit 
approval from MMS regulators outside of their jurisdiction). 
111 Id. at 73 (discussing how MMS regulations lagged behind advances in safety 
technology and did not address the changing nature of offshore oil exploration). 
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1.  The Clean Water Act’s “Best Available Technology” Standard 
The Clean Water Act utilizes technology-based CWA standards to 
control pollutant discharges into navigable waterways.112 Under the 
CWA, technology-based standards require point sources that 
discharge pollutants to implement technology and practices in 
accordance with the best available technology in their industry.113 The 
process for establishing technology-based standards requires four 
basic steps: (1) identification of potential polluters, (2) classification 
of polluters into industry categories,114 (3) determination of 
technology available to each industry category, and (4) the 
establishment of control standards for each industry with respect to 
available technology and cost considerations.115 
The technology-based approach possesses several regulatory 
advantages. First, technology-based standards achieve regulatory 
goals much quicker than other regulatory schemes.116 Second, 
technology-based standards establish uniform control settings across 
an entire industry, thereby avoiding the excess regulatory cost of 
establishing standards on a case by case basis.117 Third, technology-
based standards ensure a market for industries that develop more 
advanced control technology.118 Fourth, standards based on available 
 
112 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at § 1316(b) (2011) (establishing a non-exhaustive list of industry categories to 
be regulated under the CWA). 
115 Id. at § 1314(b)(2) (establishing a procedure that requires the EPA to determine the 
best available technology economically achievable with respect to cost considerations for 
each industry). 
116 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of 
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 590–91 (2005) (noting that technology-based standards are the 
most effective way of achieving a prompt reduction of water pollution); Karen M. 
Wardzinsky et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 8, 16 (Partenia B. Evans ed., 
1994) (noting that technology-based standards have been credited with helping to achieve 
relatively quick reductions in discharges of some pollutants). 
117 Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National 
Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 
252 (1997) (noting that uniform control settings avoid the excess costs of tailoring 
regulations to local conditions and also protect interstate commerce by preempting state 
and local governments from promulgating diverse regulatory requirements). 
118 Wardzinsky et al., supra note 116, at 14; Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. 
Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with America: Improving 
Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN J. L. & PUB.  
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technology allow regulators to keep pace with the advancements and 
challenges that face specific industries. 
Technology-based standards, however, have been attacked on 
several grounds. Some argue that technology-based standards require 
certain industries to implement expensive and unnecessary control 
mechanisms.119 Critics also note that technology-based standards, in 
reality, impede future control technology development because 
industries fear that improved technology will result in more stringent 
regulations in the future.120 
The primary technology-based standard under the CWA is “Best 
Available Technology Economically Achievable” (BAT).121 Under 
the CWA, the BAT standard requires the implementation of “the best 
control measures and practices achievable including treatment 
techniques, process and procedure innovations, operating methods, 
and other alternatives.”122 To determine best practices and control 
measures, the EPA evaluates optimal plant operations123 and conducts 
pilot plant studies.124 After indentifying best practices, regulators take 
into account the following factors: (1) age of equipment and facilities; 
(2) processes employed; (3) the engineering aspects of applying 
various types of control techniques; (4) process changes; (5) 
implementation costs; (6) non-water quality environmental impact; 
and, (7) other factors deemed appropriate.125 Unlike other technology 
standards, Congress does not require regulators to compare the costs 
and benefits of implementing the BAT standard.126 Regulators are 
 
POL’Y, Winter 1996, at 9, 12 (noting that technology-based standards have the potential to 
force the development of better pollution control technology). 
119 Karen M. Rimmele, Do Removal Credits Deserve Credit? An Analysis of POTWs 
and the CWA Removal Credit Program, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 256 (1994) (discussing 
that technology-based standards often over-regulate certain industry members and force 
them to implement costly and unneeded pollution technology). 
120 Evans, supra note 116, at 14 (noting the criticism that technology-based standards 
stifle innovation over the fear that improved technology will result in more stringent future 
regulations). 
121 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
122 Id. at § 1314(b)(2)(A). 
123 See Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 657 n.51 (3d Cir. 1983). 
124 See Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 
F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1976). 
125 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). 
126 EVANS, supra note 116, at 20 (noting that the Best Practicable Control Technology 
Currently Available (BPT) and Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology (BCT) 
standards require a stricter cost-benefit analysis than BAT standards). 
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only required to “take into account” costs in setting BAT limits.127 
The BAT standard, like other technology-based standards, does not 
specify particular technologies that must be implemented on all 
members of an industry. Instead, the standard outlines a range of 
technology that members of an industry may choose from to be in 
compliance.128 
The BAT standard encountered much of the same praise and 
criticism directed towards other technology-based regulations. One 
criticism is that the BAT standard prompts massive amounts of 
complex litigation and adversarial rulemaking proceedings by 
industry due to the high costs of regulatory compliance.129 
Additionally, the BAT standard inherently requires regulators to make 
political and economic trade-offs in implementing and enforcing the 
standard.130 Critics also note that the BAT standard, in particular, 
encourages a freeze in technology131 and invites influence by special 
interests.132 On the other hand, the BAT standard has drastically 
limited water pollution in navigable waters.133 In addition, the BAT 
standard reduces water pollution more quickly than other regulatory 
methods.134 
 
127 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(b). 
128 EVANS, supra note 116, at 16. 
129 BAT involves the centralized determination of complex scientific, engineering, 
and economic issues regarding the feasibility of controls on hundreds of thousands 
of pollution sources. Such determinations impose massive information-gathering 
burdens on administrators, and provide a fertile ground for complex litigation in the 
form of massive adversary rulemaking proceedings and protracted judicial review. 
Given the high costs of regulatory compliance and the potential gains from 
litigation brought to defeat or delay regulatory requirements, it is often more cost-
effective for industry to “invest” in such litigation rather than to comply. 
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1985). 
130 Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to 
Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 841 (1997). 
131 Id. at 842–43; see Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 
627–29 (1991) (arguing that the BAT standard discourages citizen and representative 
debate about environmental ends and penalizes new and improved technology by only 
requiring its implementation on new sources). 
132 Vandenbergh, supra note 130, at 852–53 (discussing the impact of special interest 
groups on the BAT standard). 
133 Evans, supra note 116, at 24. 
134 Id. 
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2.  A Truly Uniform BAT Regulatory Scheme? 
Although the BAT standard establishes uniform control settings 
across an industry, the CWA’s acceptance of variances erodes BAT’s 
uniformity. The CWA allows administrators to issue modifications, 
called variances, to the technology standards that are required under a 
point source discharge permit.135 The two most common variances 
under the CWA are the economic incompatibility variance and the 
fundamentally different factors (FDF) variance. Administrators are 
allowed to issue an economic incompatibility variance for BAT when 
a point source shows that the variance “will represent the maximum 
use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or 
operator” and “will result in reasonable further progress toward the 
elimination of the discharge of pollutants.”136 FDF variances are 
allowed when an owner or operator shows that its “facility is 
fundamentally different with respect to factors (other than cost).”137 
Critics raise concerns over the potential for economic variances to 
erode the viability of the BAT standard. Initially, regulators viewed 
economic variances as a mechanism that allowed small business 
owners and marginal polluters to achieve minimal pollution 
reduction, while also avoiding massive layoffs and plant closures.138 
Although Congress intended for economic variances to largely benefit 
businesses with limited resources, special interest groups for large-
scale polluters now use the economic variance as a powerful tool to 
obtain numerous exemptions for pollution control standards and 
implementation deadlines to the point where BAT is rendered 
useless.139 
FDF variances also exclude certain industry members from the 
BAT standard. Unlike economic variances, however, regulators grant 
FDF variances on factors other than economic capability.140 The 
CWA’s technology-based standards are based on the technology used 
at model plants.141 Every regulated member of an industry, however, 
 
135 Id. 
136 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (2010). 
137 Id. at § 1311(n)(1)(A). 
138 See Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting 
legislative concerns over the Clean Water Act’s ability to hurt small businesses through 
the imposition of strict pollution control standards). 
139 EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 81 (1980). 
140 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n) (2010). 
141 See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 212 
(3d ed. 2010). 
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does not resemble the model plants used by the EPA to establish 
BAT.142 When a regulated plant is vastly different from the model 
plant, it is deemed to possess fundamentally different factors that 
allow for a variance in the pollution control standards it must 
follow.143 Although some view the FDF variance as an escape 
mechanism for would-be polluters, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld FDF variances, characterizing them as a “laudable corrective 
mechanism” for standards that are implemented without taking into 
account all relevant factors.144 After approval of FDF variances by the 
EPA and the Supreme Court, Congress codified the FDF variance in 
the CWA.145 
The FDF and economic variances, while similar, are also dissimilar 
in a number of ways. Although both variances allow for a 
modification in the level of technology required under the CWA, the 
purpose of each variance is significantly different.146 The economic 
variance operates as an exemption mechanism for properly classified 
regulated entities without the financial resources to implement the 
BAT standard. FDF variances, however, create a mechanism for 
entities “to demonstrate that they were improperly classified in the 
first place.”147 The FDF variance allows one to prove its improper 
classification by showing that it is fundamentally different from other 
point sources in its specific industry and requires modified 
regulation.148 Thus, the FDF variance does indeed serve as a 
corrective mechanism under the CWA,149 as opposed to the economic 
variance that exists purely as an exemption device. 
 
142 Id. 
143 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n) (2010). 
144 See EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 81 (1980). See also Chemical 
Mfg. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (stating that, “An FDF variance does not 
excuse compliance with a correct requirement, but instead represents an acknowledgement 
that not all relevant factors were taken sufficiently into account in framing that 
requirement originally, and that those relevant factors, properly considered, would have 
justified—indeed, required—the creation of a subcategory for the discharger in question”).  
145 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n) (2010). 
146 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), 1311(n) (2010); Jay D. Wexler, The 
(Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 308–16 (noting the 
similarities and differences between the economic and FDF variances). 
147 Wexler, supra note 146, at 309 (emphasis added). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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E.  Recognizing the International Call to Action 
The regulatory collapse behind the Deepwater Horizon spill 
resulted in proposed reform in jurisdictions outside of the United 
States. Recently, the European Union’s (EU) European Commission 
(Commission) issued its report on needed regulatory reform to the 
European Parliament and Council.150 The Commission’s 
recommendations focused on the implementation of safety and 
environmental protection technology in offshore oil exploration, both 
in Europe and worldwide.151 Like the feasibility standards under the 
CWA, the Commission’s recommendations included a regulatory 
regime that incorporated uniform technology standards “inspired by 
the state of the art” technology available to the offshore oil 
exploration industry sector.152 Similar to the EPA’s approach in 
promulgating the BAT standard, the Commission argued that uniform 
technology standards must consider the financial and technical 
capabilities of industry.153 Finally, the recommendations suggested 
that promulgated standards be updated in accordance with 
technological advances and apply to all existing and future offshore 
oil operations.154 
The Commission’s recommendations, however, did not stop at the 
implementation of a BAT-like regulatory standard. In fact, the 
Commission determined that offshore oil exploration needed a 
complete regulatory overhaul much like the one needed under U.S. 
law.155 In addition to uniform technology standards, the Commission 
suggested that EU member states establish a voluntary 
consultation/reporting process allowing adjacent states to peer review 
other states’ licensing procedures for offshore oil exploration.156 The 
recommendations also endorsed an information disclosure mechanism 
to give citizens easy access to “continuously updated information on 
 
150 See generally Facing the Challenge of the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, 
SEC (2010) 1193 final (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Facing the Challenge], available at 
http://eur-6x.europa.eu/LExUriServ/LexUriServdo?uri=com:2010:0560:FIN:EN:PDF. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at 6. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See Facing the Challenge, supra note 150, at 5–14 (noting the need for (1) 
responsible licensing procedures, (2) liability regimes, (3) new models for public 
oversight, (4) precautionary mechanisms, (5) regional initiatives to promote international 
cooperation in offshore oil exploration, and (6) greater responsibility on the industry and 
global communities). 
156 Id. at 9–10. 
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safety measures, risk management, contingency plans and company-
specific statistics on key safety indicators.”157 The Commission also 
agreed to work with EU member states “to provide a framework for 
independent evaluation of the performance of national regulators.”158 
The Commission also stated that the European Union should assist 
industry in responding to future oil spills.159 Currently, the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) focuses on pollution from vessels 
and emergency response activities.160 The Commission, however, 
suggested that the EMSA could “meaningfully intervene” in cases of 
oil spills at offshore platforms because the EMSA staff “can cope 
with an oil spill irrespective of its source.”161 The Commission also 
proposed that oil companies with headquarters located in the 
European Union’s jurisdiction comply with uniform safety and 
environmental policies in all offshore operations worldwide.162 
The final and possibly most important recommendation of the 
Commission was its call for globalized efforts to implement uniform 
control technology in offshore oil exploration.163 The Commission 
specifically urged the European Union to join forces with the United 
States, Norway, Russia, and OPEC members to set safety 
benchmarks164 that achieve two primary objectives: (1) the 
implementation of strict rules on safety and accident prevention in all 
jurisdictions with offshore oil exploration activities; and (2) 
coordinated efforts by jurisdictions in accordance with the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to implement 
safety standards beyond a nation’s jurisdiction.165 
The European Union’s call for reform signals the need for action 
by the United States. Like the European Union, the United States 
must reform its offshore oil exploration regulatory regime to prevent 
future disasters in not only the Gulf Coast, but in all territorial waters. 
 
157 Id. at 10. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 10–11. 
160 Id. at 11. 
161 Facing the Challenge, supra note 150, at 11. 
162 Id. at 13. Interestingly enough, British Petroleum (BP) and Royal Dutch Shell 
(Shell) both are headquartered within EU territory. BP maintains its headquarters in 
London and Shell is headquartered at The Hague, Netherlands, and also maintains a 
registered office in London. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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In doing so, the United States must encourage change from 
government, industry, and the general public in order to formulate a 
regulatory scheme that both prevents offshore oil accidents and 
adequately responds to future disasters. 
II 
A BAT REGULATORY SCHEME FOR OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was an event that cues the need 
for environmental reform. The regulatory and human failures behind 
the spill were avoidable if a proper safety and cleanup technology 
scheme existed. To prevent future disasters, Congress and the 
BOEMRE must cooperate and establish a statutory and regulatory 
regime requiring technology that adequately responds to the 
challenges of deepwater oil exploration. 
A.  Identifying the Regulated Industry Players 
To properly mandate any type of technology-based standard, 
Congress and regulators must first identify which entities to regulate. 
While one may think that deepwater oil exploration only requires 
regulation of major oil corporations like BP, Shell, and Exxon Mobil, 
deepwater oil exploration is conducted by a number of industrial 
entities. Although major oil corporations do invest billions of dollars 
each year into deepwater exploration, their operations are often 
conducted by numerous independent contractors. 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill provides an insight to the 
corporate structure of offshore oil exploration.166 Although BP was 
the primary financier of activities at the Macondo well, exploration 
was carried out by Transocean, an independent offshore oil 
exploration contractor.167 Transocean provided the Deepwater 
Horizon platform, drilling equipment, and rig support staff. 
Transocean’s services at the Macondo well cost BP roughly half a 
million dollars a day.168 BP also utilized other independent contractors 
 
166 On the day of the Deepwater Horizon’s blowout, approximately 126 people were 
onboard the rig including eighty Transocean employees, several BP executives, cafeteria 
and laundry staff, and independent contractors. DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, 
supra note 2, at 3. 
167 Id. at 2. 
168 See Braden Reddall, Transocean Rig Loss’s Financial Impact Nulled, Reuters, Apr. 
22, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/22/transocean-impact-id 
USN2211325420100422 (noting BP’s costs for usage of the Deepwater Horizon and 
Transocean staff). 
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on the Deepwater Horizon rig.169 Depending on the status of the well, 
independent contractors included Halliburton for cementing jobs, 
Sperry Sun (a Halliburton subsidiary) for drilling mud loggers, and 
M-I SWACO (a subsidiary of the international oilfield services 
provider, Schlumberg) for drilling mud engineers.170 
To implement a successful technology-based regulatory regime, 
technology standards must extend to each phase of deepwater oil 
exploration. Because offshore oil ventures often involve a number of 
independent entities, regulators must enforce technology standards 
against all entities to maintain proper oversight over the entire 
offshore oil exploration process. By emphasizing regulatory oversight 
over every entity involved in each phase of deepwater oil ventures, 
regulators can better maintain compliance over deepwater exploration 
from cradle to grave. 
B.  Classifying the Regulated Industry Players 
OCSLA charges BOEMRE with the authority to regulate offshore 
oil exploration in the Gulf Coast of the OCS; BOEMRE’s jurisdiction 
also extends to the Alaskan and Pacific outer continental shelf 
regions.171 The geographic distinctions within OCS regions are 
important because each region possesses its own advantages and 
challenges in offshore oil exploration. In order to implement 
sufficient technology in deepwater oil exploration, statutory language 
and promulgated regulations must take into account the factors 
particular to each OCSLA geographic region. Therefore, it is essential 
to understand the different dynamics at play in each of OCSLA’s 
geographic regions. 
The Alaska OCS spans approximately one billion acres and 
contains conditions that regulators must take into account when 
 
169 DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
170 Id. at 3. 
171 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, 
WHO IS BOEMRE? (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.boemre.gov/aboutBOEMRE/. OCSLA 
also regulates oil and gas activities in the Atlantic OCS as well. The Atlantic OCS has 
been inactive since 1983. Between 1976 and 1983, only ten oil leases were granted in the 
Atlantic OCS; since 1983 all exploration wells under the ten granted leases have been 
abandoned or deemed noncommercial. Atlantic Information, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.boemre 
.gov/offshore/atlantic.htm. 
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granting drilling permits to prospective drillers.172 The Alaska OCS is 
home to extreme sea ice and ocean current conditions that may 
aggravate the effects of oil spills.173 In addition, offshore oil ventures 
also must take into account the effects of exploration on specific 
species that native Alaskans depend on for sustenance.174 Finally, 
BOEMRE expressed concerns about offshore oil exploration’s effect 
on heavy metal and hydrocarbon levels, specifically within the 
Beaufort Sea.175 
The Pacific OCS currently has forty-nine active oil and gas leases 
spanning over 240,000 acres.176 The Pacific OCS differs from the 
other OCS regions in several ways. The region is home to numerous 
regional rockfish and southern sea otter populations.177 Furthermore, 
the federal government is currently researching improved topography 
information regarding the location of pipeline and anchorage sites in 
the Pacific.178 The effects of hydrocarbons and other air emissions are 
also a major concern because of the Pacific OCS’s proximity to 
California.179 Finally, concerns exist regarding the risk of an oil spill 
on the rocky intertidal zones and coastlines of Pacific states.180 
The Gulf of Mexico OCS, the site of the Deepwater Horizon spill, 
contains over thirty-two million acres leased for offshore oil 
 
172 ALASKA ANNUAL STUDIES PLAN, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Oct. 2010), available at http://alaska.boemre.gov 
/ess/essp/sp2011.pdf. 
173 Id. at 17. 
174 Id. BOEMRE is currently conducting studies on the effects of oil exploration in the 
Alaska OCS on bowhead whale, beluga whale, and polar bear populations in the region. 
Id. at 17–18. 
175 Id. at 7. 
176 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 
PACIFIC REGION, FACTS & FIGURES (last updated June 10, 2011), http://www.boemre.gov 
/omm/pacific/offshore/currentfacts.htm [hereinafter, PACIFIC REGION, FACTS & FIGURES]. 
177 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2012 STUDIES 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN PACIFIC OCS REGION 7 (2009), available at http://www.boemre.gov 
/omm/pacific/enviro/2010-2012_Studies_plan.pdf (noting the risks that offshore oil 
exploration may pose to rockfish and sea otter populations in the Pacific OCS). 
178 Id. at 17–18. 
179 See PACIFIC REGION, FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 176 (noting offshore oil 
exploration’s affect on air quality in Pacific states and BOEMRE’s work in cooperation 
with the EPA to mitigate air quality problems through the Clean Air Act and BOEMRE 
regulations). 
180 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND 
ENFORCEMENT MULTI-AGENCY ROCKY INTERTIDAL NETWORK (MARINE) STUDY OF 
ROCKY INTERTIDAL COMMUNITIES ADJACENT TO OCS ACTIVITIES—FINAL REPORT 
(2007–2010) (2010), available at http://www.boemre.gov/omm/pacific/enviro/Enviro-
Studies/2010-005_MARINe_Raimondi.pdf. 
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exploration.181 Exploration in the Gulf encounters numerous 
conditions not found in other OCS regions. Varied weather patterns, 
especially the risk of hurricanes, are often present in the Gulf.182 In 
addition, exploration can affect the commercial fishing and tourism 
industries vital to the Gulf Coast.183 The risk of a major oil spill and 
its effects is a genuine concern regarding exploration in the Gulf 
OCS. In Environmental Impact Statements,184 the MMS specifically 
addressed the risk of major oil spills and noted the dangers that spills 
posed to Gulf Coast beaches and wetlands.185 Although increased 
risks exist in the Gulf, exploration has grown in the region because of 
the Gulf’s potential for production wells.186 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster shows how a failure to account 
for specific geographic risks can result in catastrophic losses. In the 
wake of the spill, regulators discovered that BP’s oil spill response 
plan did not adequately consider the effects of an oil spill on the Gulf 
Coast and included irrelevant information on risks related to 
exploration in OCS regions other than the Gulf.187 Under the plan, BP 
 
181 BOEM Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Blocks and Active Leases by Planning Area, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1, 
2011), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/mau_gom_pa.pdf.  
182 LESLEY D. NIXON, ET AL., DEEPWATER GULF OF MEXICO 2009: INTERIM REPORT 
OF 2008 HIGHLIGHT, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE 33–34 (May 2009), available at 
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2009/2009-016.pdf. 
183 GULF OF MEXICO OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES: 2007–2012, MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs 
/2006/2006-062-Vol1.pdf (noting the potential risks to the commercial fishing and tourism 
industries of the Gulf Coast from the sale of offshore oil and gas leases in the Gulf). 
184 Environmental Impact Statements are reports that consider the environmental costs 
and benefits of major federal actions that significantly affect the environment under the 
National Environmental Policy Act. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
4332 (2010) (establishing the criteria that must be included in reports considering the costs 
and benefits of major federal actions significantly affecting the environment). 
185 Among the specific risks addressed in the MMS 2006 Environmental Impact 
Statement was the risk of a major oil spill in the Gulf and its affect on the Gulf of Mexico 
and Gulf Coast states. Id. 
186 See BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Blocks and Active Leases by Planning 
Area, supra note 181 (showing the vast amount of offshore oil production ventures in the 
Gulf of Mexico OCS). 
187 BP’s Oil Spill response plan, which was approved by MMS regulators without 
much attention to detail, included spill response plans that were directly copied from 
government agency websites. The spill response plan was not specifically catered to the 
realities of deepwater exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, the spill response 
plan included information on biological effects on wildlife not found in the Gulf including 
sea otters, sea lions, and walruses. See Nixon et. al., supra note 182, at 84. See also 
BRITISH PETROLEUM, GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN (June 30,  
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assured regulators that the company was fully prepared for spills ten 
times worse than the one that occurred at Deepwater Horizon.188 The 
company stated in its contingency plans and spill scenarios that 
beaches would remain pristine and that fish, marine mammals, and 
migratory birds would escape serious harm.189 BP’s overly positive 
assumptions, however, were proven wrong in the months following 
the Deepwater Horizon spill. The company was ultimately ineffective 
at mitigating the damage to the Gulf Coast due, in part, to their failure 
to address the specific risks to the Gulf.190 
The failure of BP’s response to the Deepwater Horizon spill shows 
the need for geographic categorization when promulgating safety and 
cleanup technology standards. While the three OCS regions do 
ultimately possess a number of similar problems, their distinct 
differences cannot simply be brushed aside. The different risks to 
each region require that adopted safety and cleanup technology 
standards properly mitigate specific harms. Therefore, regulated 
deepwater oil exploration companies must be categorized with their 
specific geographic locations in mind. Regulators will be forced to 
recognize the realities of offshore oil exploration and promulgate 
regulations that require the oil industry to implement spill prevention 
and response mechanisms that are narrowly tailored to the challenges 
present in each OCS region. 
C.  Finding the Best Available Technology 
In promulgating a BAT regulatory standard, regulators must find 
the best available technology for each industrial category. Within the 
context of deepwater oil exploration, regulators must specifically 
identify the best spill prevention and spill response technology. The 
identified technology, however, must adequately respond to the 
particular risks associated with deepwater exploration in each OCS 
region. The Deepwater Horizon disaster presents a unique 
opportunity that regulators can utilize to compare and contrast the 
effects of utilizing substandard technology instead of the best 
available technology. 
 
2009), available at http://www .boemre.gov/DeepwaterHorizon/BP_Regional_OSRP 
_Redactedv2.pdf [hereinafter BP GULF OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN]. 
188 BP’s Spill Contingency Plans Vastly Inadequate, CBS NEWS, June 9, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/09/national/main6563631.shtml. 
189 Id. See BP GULF OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 187. 
190 See discussion supra Part I.B (describing BP and the federal government’s 
inadequate cleanup response to the Deepwater Horizon spill). 
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In order to identify the best technology, however, regulators must 
proactively investigate what measures can truly improve deepwater 
exploration technology. To achieve this end, regulators may look to a 
variety of sources: (1) oil industry members with stellar safety 
records, (2) safety regulations from nations with strict safety 
compliance standards, (3) industries that have a primary business 
interest in advancing deepwater safety and cleanup technology, and 
(4) research and development of what technology hypothetical model 
platforms would implement. Although such testing is currently in 
progress, the following sections suggest several technology mandates 
that could resolve the technology gaps present at the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster. 
1.  The Best Available Safety Technology 
In the years leading up to the Deepwater Horizon spill, regulators 
failed to keep pace with the advances in safety technology and best 
practices in deepwater exploration. Regulators’ lack of oversight 
allowed the oil industry to cut corners in not only their 
implementation of safety technology, but their exploration practices 
as well. Thus, regulators should consider implementing the following 
technology advances and best practices on all future deepwater 
exploration ventures. 
The implementation of secondary preventive technology in cases 
of blowout preventer failure is the primary technology improvement 
needed in deepwater exploration. Blowout preventers currently serve 
as the last line of defense in deepwater exploration. The Deepwater 
Horizon spill shows, however, that blowout preventers are not fail-
safe devices. Blowout preventers are normally activated automatically 
by platform employees from a control station, but sufficient manual 
control technology and training is needed for platform employees to 
manually seal wells in cases where the automated components of a 
blowout preventer fail. Finally, regulators must mandate the 
construction of backup blowout preventers in cases where a primary 
blowout preventer fails. 
Regulators must also mandate best practices that ensure 
engineering decisions on deepwater exploration rigs are scientifically 
sound. Engineers’ actions at the Deepwater Horizon rig show that a 
failure to mandate best practices allows the oil industry to give undue 
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deference to time and cost factors as opposed to safety factors.191 
Thus, regulators must serve as a watchdog over industry decision-
making. To maintain watchdog status, however, regulators must 
mandate strict permitting requirements and give necessary scrutiny to 
all actions by rig employees that deviate from previously approved 
drilling plans. 
Greater emphasis on best practices may have mitigated or even 
prevented the damage caused by the shortcuts taken by platform 
employees. For example, regulators may have prevented BP from 
utilizing only six centralizers, as opposed to the recommended 
twenty-one, when applying the cement seal to the wellbore.192 In 
addition, regulators could have provided interpretation guidance on 
the pressure test results and the potential risks associated with BP’s 
decision to replace drilling mud with seawater.193 BP engineers knew 
the risks involved with each of these decisions, but there were no 
regulatory mandates or incentives for them to consider the negative 
impacts of risky engineering choices. Therefore, future deepwater 
exploration requires an intense oversight program where regulators 
are constantly in contact with platform employees to ensure sound 
decision-making. 
In order to achieve an adequate level of oversight between 
regulators and industry, the federal government must overhaul the 
structure of its regulatory operations. The inability of the MMS to 
maintain twenty-four hour supervision over deepwater exploration 
because of insufficient resources signals the need for greater agency 
funding and oversight.194 Because deepwater exploration requires 
companies to deviate from their original exploration plan at times, 
regulators need adequate resources to evaluate the decision making of 
platform employees. Therefore, the government must provide 
adequate funding to BOEMRE to enable the agency to hire a 
sufficient number of regulators and maintain minimum staffing levels 
 
191 See discussion supra Part I.A–B (discussing the various engineering decisions by 
BP and Transocean engineers that led to the Deepwater Horizon’s blowout). 
192 See Hammer, supra note 28 (describing BP’s decision to cement seal the Deepwater 
Horizon’s wellbore without a sufficient number of centralizers). See also DEEP WATER: 
THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 95–97 (describing the risks posed by BP’s 
inadequate cement seal on the Deepwater Horizon rig). 
193 See Hammer, supra note 28; DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, 
at 102–04; Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 29, at 35 (describing the 
risks posed by BP’s decision to displace drilling mud with seawater prior to the blowout). 
194 See DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 2, at 72–82 (describing the 
MMS inability to enforce its regulatory regime because of inadequate resources). 
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around the clock due to the twenty-four hour a day pace of deepwater 
exploration. 
2.  The Best Available Cleanup Technology 
One of the few positive effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill was 
the significant development of cleanup technology for offshore oil 
spills. Because the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred at greater depths 
than any spill in history, it prompted a rapid development of cleanup 
technology.195 To adequately respond to future deepwater spills, 
regulators must further research and mandate the implementation of 
this technology. 
The first priority of any major oil spill response effort is to stop the 
flow of oil into the ocean. The inability of BP and regulators to solve 
this problem at the outset of the Deepwater Horizon spill resulted in 
eighty-seven days of uncontrolled oil seepage into the Gulf. Future 
deepwater exploration ventures can avoid this setback by maintaining 
contingency plans that allow for the quick and efficient execution of 
static kills for deepwater wells containing large amounts of pressure 
and hydrates. Such plans must also allow for the implementation of 
the top kill and containment dome methods in situations where those 
methods are most effective. Finally, the federal government should 
encourage and incentivize the development of more advanced spill 
containment technology. 
The Deepwater Horizon spill also prompted the development and 
greater use of deepwater dispersant technology. Although the use of 
deepwater dispersants was initially stifled at the Deepwater Horizon 
spill site, EPA mandates and guidelines now exist for their use. 
Therefore, response teams are able to attack and break down leaking 
oil at the source of a spill before oil reaches the surface. Regulators 
should require that spill response plans also contain plans for the 
immediate use of deepwater dispersants in response to future spills. In 
addition, the EPA must continue its study of deepwater dispersant 
toxicity and determine if deepwater dispersants may be used in 
greater quantities than allowed at the Deepwater Horizon spill site. 
By continually evaluating and implementing advances in safety 
and cleanup technology, regulators can ensure that deepwater 
exploration safety stays on the cutting edge. While it must be noted 
 
195 See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing the cleanup response to the Deepwater 
Horizon spill). 
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that the suggested technology implementations are not the only 
advances that deepwater explorations may utilize, the aforementioned 
suggestions do, however, provide a sound basis for future 
technological development that regulators and industry must foster. 
D.  Settings Control Ranges and the Role of Costs 
The primary source of industrial backlash against proposed 
regulatory change is its costs to industry. This concern is not 
unexpected because the requirement of greater technology 
implementation of regulatory oversight likely requires greater initial 
investments by the oil industry and time delays. Because costs play 
such a role in industry decision-making, regulators must give less 
deference to costs in order to achieve the goals of a regulatory 
scheme. The Best Available Technology (BAT) standard serves as the 
primary technology standard mechanism for limiting the influence of 
cost of regulatory mandates. The BAT standard only mandates a 
consideration of costs when promulgating control settings as opposed 
to other settings that adhere more closely to a strict cost benefit 
analysis.196 By promulgating a standard that does not strictly adhere to 
cost-benefit principles, regulators can ensure that safety and cleanup 
standards are not eroded by cost-benefit factors. Therefore, regulators 
can ensure that deepwater exploration regulatory reforms truly 
implement the best available technology as opposed to technology 
that is only economically convenient. 
E.  Addressing the Risk of Variances 
Because costs play a minor role within the BAT standard, industry 
often seeks to avoid the standard in order to limit their own costs.197 
With the issuance of economic and FDF variances, industry found its 
most useful mechanism in escaping uniform technology standards. It 
is more than likely that the oil industry will seek to employ a similar 
strategy to avoid excess costs imposed under a BAT safety and 
cleanup technology standard. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
 
196 The BAT standard in the CWA mandates only a consideration of costs in setting 
control technology ranges as opposed to other standards under the CWA which adhere to a 
stricter cost-benefit analysis. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). 
197 See Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, and accompanying text (describing the 
use of variances by industry to avoid and or delay the implementation of strict technology 
standards). 
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what role variances should play in a reformed deepwater exploration 
regulatory scheme. 
Economic variances pose a significant risk to the viability of a 
BAT safety and cleanup technology standard. Because increased 
technology requirements often necessitate increased expenditures by 
industry, it is likely that the oil industry will argue that it is not 
economically capable of implementing the BAT standard.198 It is 
important, however, that regulators recognize that the oil industry is 
vastly different than industries with economic variances under the 
CWA and other statutes. Under the CWA, the economic variance was 
partly upheld because it allowed small businesses and marginal 
polluters to avoid mass layoffs and plant closures. Deepwater 
exploration, on the other hand, is undertaken by large corporations 
with large amounts of investment capital.199 Unlike small businesses 
and marginal polluters affected by the CWA, members of the oil 
industry are capable of bearing the costs associated with the BAT 
standard. 
Basic principles of justice also suggest that it is fairer to require 
that actors enjoying economic benefit from an activity also bear the 
economic costs of their activity as opposed to innocent bystanders.200 
By allowing the oil industry to delay or avoid technology 
implementation through economic variances, future oil spills may not 
 
198 In response to the promulgation of the BAT standard under the Clean Water Act, 
regulated industries engaged in an aggressive litigation campaign against the EPA. The 
implementation of increased regulatory oversight over deepwater exploration may result in 
a similar backlash. The oil industry will likely argue that new technology standards only 
apply to future deepwater oil projects to avoid the excess costs of retrofitting existing 
platforms. In addition, the oil industry may attempt to avoid implementation timelines. 
Thus, regulators must prepare to face a barrage of judicial and political resistance upon the 
establishment of a BAT safety and cleanup technology standard. 
199 See Phuong Lee & John Flesher, Oil Companies Spend Little on Cleanup 
Technology, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/26 
/business/main6621098.shtml (noting that in the past three years BP, Exxon Mobil, 
Conoco Phillips, Chevron, and Shell Oil spent a combined $33.8 billion on oil and gas 
exploration). 
200 The Big Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2010: Hearing on S. 3305 Before the S. 
Comm. on Environment & Public Works, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of Prof. 
Kenneth Murchison) (noting the aspect of moral fairness that requires the oil industry to 
bear the burdens of liability as opposed to society). Although the cited testimony was in 
regards to liability for the damages caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill, the same 
principle of fairness must be considered when determining if economic variances have a 
role in a reformed regulatory regime for deepwater exploration safety and cleanup 
technology. 
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be averted, leaving society to bear the costs of the oil industry’s 
avoidance of strict regulatory standards. Therefore, economic 
variances under a deepwater oil exploration BAT standard are not 
only poor public policy in economic terms but in moral fairness as 
well. In order to avoid future oil spills and industry exploitation of the 
economic variance, Congress must statutorily prohibit regulators from 
issuing economic variances under promulgated BAT standards. 
While the issuance of economic variances poses significant public 
policy concerns, FDF variances can still serve an important function 
in deepwater exploration. As previously stated, FDF variances differ 
from economic variances because they serve as a corrective 
mechanism for improperly classified entities instead of a mere safety 
valve.201 The proposed BAT standard, under the regulatory regime 
explained above, categorizes regulated deepwater exploration 
ventures by their respective OCS region. It is important to note, 
however, that OCS regions may contain varied topographical, 
climate, and environmental conditions within their boundaries.202 
Considering that each OCS region covers massive amounts of 
territory, one could easily conjecture that each region may contain 
different challenges within its own boundaries. 
With the potential for varied conditions within a single OCS 
region, a uniform BAT standard may require the implementation of 
technology that serves no benefit to the safety of a a specific 
deepwater exploration venture. The FDF variance may serve as a 
viable corrective mechanism to avoid the implementation of 
unnecessary technology in this scenario. Importantly, the FDF 
variance rests on more sound policy grounds than economic 
variances. FDF variances exempt deepwater exploration ventures 
from implementing unnecessary technology, as opposed to the 
economic variance, which may exempt ventures from implementing 
truly necessary technology. Therefore, regulators should issue FDF 
variances, albeit in a limited number of circumstances, when the 
variance can serve as a corrective mechanism to avoid unnecessary 
technology implementation costs. 
 
201 See Chemical Mfg. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (describing the FDF 
variance’s role under the Clean Water Act). See also Wexler, supra note 146, at 309 
(noting that FDF variances serve as a mechanism that benefits industry members that were 
improperly classified under the CWA’s regulatory scheme). 
202 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the three OCS regions currently under 
BOEMRE jurisdiction). 
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F.  Encouraging Deepwater Exploration Safety at Home and 
Abroad 
Regulatory oversight over deepwater oil exploration cannot simply 
be a domestic issue for the United States. Deepwater exploration 
accidents are not just limited to U.S. waters but occur in international 
and other jurisdictional waters as well.203 In addition, the corporations 
and independent contractors that conduct deepwater exploration are 
based in jurisdictions throughout the world. Thus, while massive 
spills like Deepwater Horizon may only ecologically affect a limited 
number of jurisdictions, they possess the potential to affect other 
corporations and entities throughout the world. Because of the 
international risks posed by deepwater exploration, jurisdictions must 
cooperate and maintain an adequate level of international oversight 
over deepwater oil explorations. The United States must, therefore, 
charge BOEMRE with an additional obligation under OCLSA to 
promulgate programs that emphasize international cooperation among 
nations with an interest in deepwater oil exploration. To achieve this 
goal, the United States should follow the European Commission’s call 
for increased international cooperation regarding offshore oil 
exploration.204 
To achieve international oversight over deepwater exploration, 
Congress should charge BOEMRE with the responsibility of 
establishing information disclosure mechanisms in cooperation with 
other nations. These mechanisms should include information 
regarding advances in safety and cleanup technology, best practices, 
and industry compliance. Ideally, the implementation of disclosure 
mechanisms will create a marketplace of ideas from which other 
nations’ regulatory agencies can draw or contribute information 
regarding technology and best practices. By disclosing such 
information, jurisdictions and international governing bodies can 
achieve more uniform technology standards, regardless of whether a 
 
203 Notable offshore oil blowouts include the Ixtoc I disaster off the coast of Mexico, 
the Ekofisk Bravo blowout in the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the Funiwa No. 5 blowout 
off the coast of Nigeria, and the Hasbah 6 blowout in the Gulf of Arabia. For a brief 
summary of these incidents and other oil spills see OIL SPILL CASE HISTORIES 1967–1991: 
SUMMARIES OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SPILLS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 1992), available at 
http://response.restoration.noaa .gov/book_shelf/26_spilldb.pdf. 
204 See Facing the Challenge, supra note 150, at 10–11 (noting several European 
Commission recommendations for increased international oversight). 
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deepwater exploration project is undertaken in territorial or 
international continental shelf areas.205 
III 
CONCLUSION 
While the promulgation of a BAT standard for deepwater safety 
and cleanup technology and international disclosure mechanisms may 
not serve as a panacea for all of the regulatory and industry failures 
that led to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, reformed regulatory 
oversight of deepwater exploration is a necessary starting point. The 
federal government must answer this call to action by implementing 
preventative and reactionary measures to mitigate the future risks of 
deepwater exploration. Thus, Congress should amend OCSLA to 
charge BOEMRE with the responsibility of promulgating BAT 
standards for deepwater oil exploration safety and cleanup 
technology. Furthermore, Congress must provide BOEMRE with the 
necessary fiscal resources to enforce any promulgated standards. 
If Congress accepts this call to action, then BOEMRE must ensure 
that its relationship with the oil industry stresses oversight at all times. 
Regulators must actively research and continually evolve the BAT 
standard to keep pace with new challenges that arise from increased 
deepwater exploration. In addition, regulators must avoid industry 
influence and give necessary scrutiny to all actions that could 
adversely affect safety or cleanup response technology. 
Finally, the oil industry and society at large must recognize the 
need for greater deepwater exploration regulation. The Deepwater 
Horizon disaster cues a certain immediacy, at the present time, for 
increased regulatory oversight. The call for reform, however, must 
continue after the Deepwater Horizon spill has faded from recent 
memory. Society must prepare to shoulder the burdens that industry 
may pass along because of greater regulatory oversight. This burden, 
however, must be constantly weighed against the potential for the 
 
205 Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397. 
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great harm seen in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
Therefore, society and industry each bear the responsibility of 
maintaining a precautionary perspective that elevates long-term safety 
and adequate oil spill response above short-term economic burdens. 
By implementing the calls to action suggested in this Comment, the 
federal government, the oil industry, and society can make a 
significant initial stride in preventing disasters similar to Deepwater 
Horizon. We have seen firsthand the devastation that occurs when 
these entities fail to maintain their status as watchdogs. Although the 
effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill cannot be reversed, its effects 
can be avoided in the future. This fact demands proactive governance 
beginning with regulatory change that adequately prevents and 
responds to potential oil spills in the future. 
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